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Capital Flight and the Hollowing Out of the
Philippine Economy in the Neoliberal Regime
EDSEL  L.  BEJA  JR.
ABSTRACT. Capital flight is the movement of capital from a resource-scarce developing
country to avoid social controls, measured as net unrecorded capital outflow. Capital
flight from the Philippines was USD 16 billion in the 1970s, USD 36 billion in the 1980s,
and USD 43 billion in the 1990s. Indeed these figures are significant amounts of lost
resources that could have been utilized to generate additional output and jobs. Capital
flight from the Philippines followed a revolving-door process—that is, capital inflows
were used to finance the capital outflows. This process became more pronounced with
financial liberalization in the 1990s. With these results, we argue that capital flight
resulted in the hollowing out of the Philippine economy and, more important, neoliberal
policies underpinned the process.
KEYWORDS. capital flight · external debt · revolving door · Philippine economy
INTRODUCTION
Proponents of neoliberalism argue that the neoliberal regime guarantees
an economic environment that is stable, rapidly growing and developing,
and so globalization, or even the freer reign of markets, will take care
of basic human needs, including human development.1  Moreover, it
is argued that a neoliberal environment benefits everyone rather than
only an influential segment in society. Proponents of neoliberal
economic policies also argue that this idea is self-evident and it will be
realized if, for example, the market is allowed to operate freely and if
capital is allowed to move freely, unfettered by government controls
and social regulations. After all, the market can effectively and efficiently
mediate the actions of rational individuals on where to place and how
to use their funds. Countries that fail to grow or are facing problems
in realizing growth are thus only to blame for their misfortunes because
they are not instituting neoliberal policies, and if they were
implementing them, perhaps they are not doing it the right way. In
56 CAPITAL FLIGHT AND THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY
which case, these countries must maintain their resolve in pursuing
neoliberal policies.
Recent developments in the Philippines ushered by neoliberal
reforms since the 1980s, including recent domestic adjustments to
globalization and global economic integration, might lead one to think
that capital flight is no longer an issue.2  In fact, the contention is that
with deregulation and financial liberalization, there should be no more
capital flight because there will be no more incentives to avoid social
controls.3  At the same time, economic reforms will provide the
discipline mechanisms on macroeconomic policy, make foreign savings
available to domestic entrepreneurs, etc., and so resources are put into
building businesses and creating jobs and other infrastructures necessary
for growth and development.
However, capital flight remains a problem of the Philippines
today.4  In fact, we found that capital flight increased in recent periods.
We also found that capital flight and external borrowing followed a
revolving-door process in which both types of flows are directly linked
and reinforce each other. Of course, the economic and political crises
reinforced the whole process as well. But, in the neoliberal regime, we
argue that the latest surges of capital flight have been closely linked to
deregulation and financial liberalization—that is, there are more
opportunities for capital flight and external borrowing. With these
findings, we point out that capital flight and external borrowing
resulted in the hollowing out of the Philippine economy, thus
undermining growth and development.
The following section discusses the concept of capital flight and
the methodology, followed by the results and analysis. This paper
concludes with a policy discussion.
CONCEPTS OF CAPITAL FLIGHT
Capital flight is the net unrecorded capital outflow or the residual of
officially recorded sources and uses of funds.5  Recorded sources of
funds are net additions to external debt (CDET) and net nondebt
creating capital inflows (NKI), where NKI is the net direct foreign
investments (FDI), net portfolio investment equities (PORT), and
other investment assets (OTH); recorded uses of funds are the current
account deficits (CAD) and accumulation of international reserves,
including Central Bank-sanctioned uses of foreign exchange (CRES).
Thus we obtain a baseline measure of capital flight (KF) as follows:
KF = CDET + NKI – CAD – CRES           (1.1)
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Note that data used in equation (1.1) contain errors requiring
some adjustments.6 In particular, we include an adjustment for the
impact of exchange-rate fluctuations on long-term external debts (i.e.,
CDET
ADJ
), trade misinvoicing (MIS), and unrecorded remittances
(UNREMIT):
KF = CDETADJ + NKI – CAD – CRES + MIS + UNREMIT    (1.2)
To analyze the results from equation (1.2), we utilize a model first
employed by Boyce (1992), also used to analyze the Philippine data.
The model (in table 1) is an attempt to find out the determinants (or
causes) of capital flight and external borrowing. It is, however, not a
model on the mechanisms of capital flight and external borrowing (i.e.,
the ways or means that individuals or firms use to carry out capital
flight). In other words, the model we use is an attempt to answer the
question of why there was capital flight, but it does not answer how
capital flight was undertaken or where the capital went.
The revolving-door model posits some indirect and direct
explanations of capital flight and external borrowing (table 1). Exogenous
factors separately determine capital flight and external borrowing—that
is, both are not directly linked to one another. For instance, capital
flight occurs not because of capital inflows or external borrowing per
se, but because of, say, macroeconomic mismanagement. As such,
poor economic performance scares away capital. Corrolarily, a country
becomes highly indebted not because of capital flight but because of,
again, macroeconomic mismanagement. Along this argument, it can
be said that policy mistakes, corruption, rent-seeking behavior, among
others, induce capital flight and lead to external indebtedness. A
related point is that capital inflows (especially during surges of capital
flows) lead to economic instabilities, and eventually, a financial crisis
(see Palma 2004), hence capital flight (see Beja, Junvith, and Ragusett
2005). Another argument is that capital inflows lead to risky and/or
unsound investment behavior, resulting in overborrowing, hence
problems with country external indebtedness (see McKinnon and Pill
1996, 1998).
This paper extends the conventional (indirect) explanations above
for the neoliberal regime in the context of the Philippines. Neoliberal
analysis posits that when such programs are pursued, there will be less
or no more capital flight because there will be no more incentives to
avoid social controls. Also, the expectation is that financial liberalization
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will make foreign funds available to domestic entrepreneurs, who in
turn will put the funds to proper use—that is, utilize the funds for
building businesses, creating jobs, and setting up infrastructures,
which are needed for growth and development. Yet, despite following
neoliberal policies—indeed the Philippines is a good example of a
country that closely followed neoliberal prescriptions (see Pritchett
2003; Bello et al. 2004)—we find that capital flight and external
borrowing have increased with deregulation and financial liberalization.
Such felicitous outcomes promised by the neoliberal regime are
only possible when economic reforms are pursued with the requisite
governance structures and the administrative capacity to carry out the
reforms. It is indeed paradoxical that while deregulation and financial
liberalization involve the loosening of direct government controls over
economic decisions and processes, successful economic management
requires enhanced regulatory institutions and prudent policies to
effectively respond to economic challenges, and to thus make the
reforms work properly (see Vogel 1996). But often, when neoliberal
policies are adopted, or in some cases forced upon developing countries,
the requisite structures, institutions, and mechanisms for administrative
capacity are not in place, if they have not been removed. Consequently,
while deregulation and financial liberalization facilitated greater capital
flows, including external debts, the funds were increasingly utilized to
finance capital outflows. In addition, we have an economic environment
that is more vulnerable to financial swings, crashes, contagions, crises,
and economic stagnation. Such an environment also actually encourages
external borrowing and facilitates capital flight.
Boyce (1992, 1993) notes that the indirect linkages cannot explain
why there is often a close year-to-year correlation between capital
inflows and capital flight. Thus the direct linkages highlight direct
causal explanations, holding, for example, that external debt itself
provides the fuel and/or driver for capital flight, and vice versa (table
1). Briefly, the process can be described as follows: external debt is
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transformed from a capital inflow to capital flight (i.e., “fuel” effect),
which ultimately ends up in private foreign bank accounts. And as
external debts accumulate, the mounting burden of debt servicing and
the bigger likelihood of debt defaults provide signals for increased risks
(i.e., “drive” effect) and hence provide a motivation for capital flight.
The causality can run in the reverse direction, too. In the case of flight-
fueled external borrowing, the money sent abroad is borrowed back,
a deal known as “back-to-back” loan. And as capital flight occurs, it
creates a financial vacuum and the country is forced, in a way, to obtain
external resources to fill the void and to fuel economic activities (i.e.,
“drive” effect).
The result of the direct and indirect linkages is a revolving process
of capital flight and debt accumulation. Pincus and Ramli (2005),
extending on their earlier work (Pincus and Ramli 1998) and that of
Rosser (2002, 2005), suggest that the strength of the direct linkages
between capital flight and external borrowing would in part depend on
the dynamics of interest coalitions in society. Similarly, the intensity
of the linkages depends on the extent the neoliberal regime has
entrenched itself in society.7  Putting together the indirect and direct
linkages described above, the revolving-door model can thus be
expressed as:
             KF = á0 + á1 CDET + á2 DEBT + á i X + e1              (2)
CDET = â0 + â1 KF + â2 RES + â i X + e2
where, as before, KF is capital flight and CDET is net additions to external
debt (equation 1.1), DEBT is the stock of external debt, RES-1 is lagged
international reserves, and X is a set of the indirect linkages and other
exogenous variables. CDET in the KF equation and KF in the CDET
equation represent the debt-fuel and the flight-fuel linkages, respectively.
DEBT in the KF equation and RES-1 in the CDET equation represent
the debt-driven and the flight-driven linkages, respectively. For fuel
linkages, we hypothesize that additions to external debt and capital
flight have positive impacts, respectively, in equation (2). For the drive
linkages, we hypothesize that external debt stock and the lagged to
international reserves have positive impacts, respectively, in equation
(2), as well. The model, however, leaves open what specific indicators
to include in X; hence, the impact on equation (2) will depend on the
actual indicator used.
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We used the World Bank’s Global Development Finance for
external debt data (DEBT), and the International Monetary Fund’s
International Financial Statistics for data on net direct foreign
investments, net portfolio investment equities, other investment
assets, current account deficits, and accumulation of international
reserves, plus Central Bank-sanctioned uses of foreign exchange (CRES).
Missing data were complied from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(Central Bank of the Philippines [BSP]). We used the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators for other economic indicators,
especially for equation (2). In addition, we also conducted a review of
recent Philippine economic history, interviewed political economy
specialists, and met with BSP staff to discuss our findings.
THE PHILIPPINES: CAPITAL FLIGHT 20008
This section discusses the results. With equation (1.1), we obtained
total capital flight (TKF) as follows: USD 16 billion for the 1970s,
USD 36 billion for the 1980s, and USD 43 billion for the 1990s.
Between 2000 and 2002, TKF was USD 36 billion. Thus, for the
whole period, the Philippines lost a total of USD 131 billion to capital
flight, or 2.8 times the country’s total external debt in 2002. By any
yardstick, these are large amounts of “lost” resources that could have
been used, for example, to generate additional output and/or create
more jobs in the country.
Figure 1 shows the trend of TKF. We observe that the figure
follows a cyclical pattern, which reflects the economic boom-bust cycle
that characterized the Philippine economy in the post-World War II
period. During an economic bust, TKF was in a boom, and vice versa.
But the TKF cycle tapers off in the later stage of a crisis, when arguably
most of the capital had left.
The frequency of the TKF cycle is also consistent with the
Philippines’ economic history, in which the economic boom spans a
brief period (usually three years) then cut abruptly by an external or
internal crisis. The events in the 1980s and earlier are already well
documented (see Boyce and Zarsky 1988; Vos 1992; Boyce 1993; Vos
and Yap 1996), but we argue that what seems to have been a different
trend since the early 1990s is basically part of the overall boom-bust
cycle that continues to characterize the Philippine economy. In other
words, the trends since the 1990s reflect only a structural break in
levels. In fact, the cycles in the 1990s had, in part, been driven by
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financial liberalization and the resurgence of foreign capital inflows to
the country, which is very similar to early surges of capital to the
country.
Figure 2 illustrates that high levels of capital flight occurred during
periods of domestic economic crises. The Latin American debt crisis
in the early 1980s was an important trigger in the balance of payments
crises in the Philippines. In the years before the crises, the Philippines
was experiencing a rapid slowdown in growth as debt burdens and
global economic slowdown took their toll on the economy. Adding to
this problem was the collapse of the capital and commodity markets
and related events, including the Dewey Dee loans default. Then in
1983, Sen. Benigno Aquino was assassinated. The ensuing political
and social unrest exacerbated the economic insecurities and uncertainties
in the country. In 1984-1985, the situation reached a lowest point
when the Philippines had its worst recession in the post-World War
II period, and because of the debt crisis and the overall economic
instability, the Philippines was cut off from external funds. Thus,
capital flight for the most part of the 1980s could only have been fueled
by domestic resources.
When Corazon Aquino became president in 1986, a difficult
political and economic recovery characterized the following years. A
series of coups d’état between 1986 and 1989 undermined the
country’s stability, culminating in economic recession and an electricity
crisis in 1991-1992. The situation yet again induced capital flight.
With the Ramos government quickly addressing the electricity crisis in
1992, investor confidence recovered, and from 1993, the Philippines
(5,000)
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
Real KF Real MIS+UNREMIT Real TKF
 
     Figure 1. Total capital flight, 1970-2002 (USD millions; 1995 constant prices) 
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appeared on track for an economic turnaround, experiencing its
longest economic expansion since the mid-1980s. But with the 1997-
1998 Asian financial crisis, Philippine economic recovery was once
again interrupted—although this time, the crisis was induced by an
external shock. As in the previous decades, economic slowdown
appears to have resulted in capital flight. Perhaps because there had
been a shorter period of capital accumulation in the Philippines, the
capital flight it suffered in the late 1990s was not as significant as that
in other affected Asian economies.
After 1998, when the Asian crisis subsided and affected Asian
economies were rallying, concerns about the Philippine economy
reemerged, especially after the election of Joseph Ejercito Estrada to
the presidency. What happened in the late 1980s seemed to have
recurred in the 1990s: domestic economic and political instability
induced capital flight. Estrada’s impeachment in 2000, the social
unrest in 2001, and the insecurity that haunts the successor government
of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo converged to reinforce doubts on the
country’s economic sustainability, and we find that since 1998, capital
flight had been large and generally rising. The upsurge of capital flight
in 2002 appears to reflect the continued concerns on the Arroyo
government and, in particular, the political instability and the
government’s indecisiveness to institute sound reforms. Recent
developments in the country would lead us to argue that there might
yet again be an upsurge of capital flight, as there appears to be a repeat
of the conditions in 2000 and 2001.
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Figure 2. Share of total capital flight to GDP, 1970-2002 (1995 constant prices) 
 
63EDSEL L. BEJA JR.
A REVOLVING DOOR?
In the regression model, (real values of) KF, CDET, DEBT, CAD, and
RES are expressed as shares of real gross domestic product (GDP).
GROW is real GDP growth rate, also expressed in percentage. In the
regression model (equation [2]), dummy variables are introduced for
periods covering the mid-1980s for the deregulation period (D1) and
from the early 1990s for financial liberalization period (D
2
). The
dummy variables are interacted with external borrowing and capital
flight, respectively, to capture the impact of neoliberal policies on
capital flight and external borrowing. It is difficult to isolate the impact
of policies over time, but we argue that the overlap in the dummy
variables and interaction terms is one (though rudimentary) way of
capturing the continued application and eventual entrenchment of
neoliberal policies in the Philippines.9
Table 2 summarizes the results. The capital flight figures (equation
[1.2]) are constrained by the nature of the external debt data, which are
available in annual figures. Researchers must be prudent in making
generalizations from the results, especially for policy prescriptions and
designing government interventions. Still, the results are useful for
analysis because they corroborate existing studies on Philippine capital
flight (see Boyce 1992, 1993; Vos 1992; Vos and Yap 1996); the
results also give us some directions on the key variables for advocacy
work.
Thus, in the case of the Philippines, the results in table 2 confirm
a revolving-door process of capital flight and external borrowing: we
found evidence of both debt-fuel and debt-driven capital flight (KF-
equations), as well as both flight-fuel and flight-driven external borrowing
(CDET equations). In particular, we found that for each dollar of
external borrowing, from USD 0.33 to USD 0.47 ended up as capital
flight each year (CDET on KF equations) from 1970 to 2002. On top
of that, a further USD 0.13 to USD 0.14 went off as capital flight each
year because of debt accumulation (SDET on KF equations). From an
economic point of view, these numbers indicate that for each dollar of
external debt, the Philippines has lost from USD 0.47 to USD 0.60
to capital flight every year in the last three decades.
In addition, we found that for each dollar of capital flight, about
USD 0.68 to USD 0.71 of external borrowing was acquired to
replenish the lost funds (KF on CDET equations). So with sustained
capital flight over the period 1970-2002, there was a further USD 0.05
to USD 0.59 of external borrowing each year (RES-1 on CDET
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equations). From an economic point of view, these results mean that
for each dollar of capital flight, the Philippines had acquired from USD
0.76 to USD 1.27 of external debt in the past three decades.
Focusing next on the indirect linkages, we found evidence that
deregulation (D
1
) and/or financial liberalization (D
2
) reinforced both
types of fuel linkages. On both the KF equations, for example, the
results for the interaction between deregulation and financial
liberalization with net additions to external debt (i.e., D
1
*CDET and
Table 2. Determinants of capital flight and external borrowing of the Philippines 
 Run 1: Deregulation Run 2: Financial liberalization 
Variable KF-equation CDET-equation KF-equation CDET-equation 
Constant -6.01 4.82 -9.51 -1.54 
 (0.24) ws (0.05) s (0.02)s (0.48)ns 
KF  0.71  0.68 
  (0.01) hs  (0.00)hs 
CDET 0.33  0.47  
 (0.20) ws  (0.02)s  
DEBT 0.14  0.13  
 (0.01) hs  (0.00)hs  
RES-1 -0.61 0.05 -0.78 0.59 
 (0.00) hs (0.74) ns (0.00)hs (0.00)hs 
GROW-1 -0.63  -0.50  
 (0.05) s  (0.05) s  
CAD-1  0.05  0.33 
  (0.84) ns  (0.06)s 
D1*KF  0.82   
  (0.00) hs   
D2*KF    1.03 
    (0.00)hs 
D1*CDET 0.74    
 (0.03) s    
D2*CDET   0.72  
   (0.01) hs  
n 33 33 33 33 
Adj. R2 0.33 0.17 0.68 0.55 
Durbin-Watson 2.00 1.53 1.96 1.76 
Note: KF = capital flight; CDET = net additions to external debt; DEBT = stock of external 
debt; RES = total international reserves; GROW = country GDP growth rate; CAD = country 
current account deficit; D1 = dummy variable for period of deregulation: value of 1 in 1986 
onward and 0 otherwise; D2 = dummy variable for period of financial liberalization (which 
includes deregulation): value of 1 in 1993 onward and 0 otherwise. KF, CDET, SDET, and 
RES-1 (on the CDET-equations) represent the direct linkages. GROW-1, CAD-1, RES-1 (on the 
KF-equations), D1*CDET, D2*CDET, D1*KF, and D2*KF are the indirect linkages. 
Deregulation and financial liberation in the Philippines started in the mid-1980s, but it was 
only in the 1990s, during the Ramos administration (1992-1998), that wide-scale and 
aggressive financial liberalization was implemented: opening the capital account in 1993, 
deregulating the domestic banking sector in 1995, and others. Results are from the Three 
Stage Least Squares procedure. Numbers in the parentheses are the p-values from EViews 5: hs 
= highly significant, s = significant, ws = weakly significant, ns = not significant. 
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D
2
*CDET, respectively) indicate that there were USD 0.72 of additional
capital flight, respectively. But the more interesting result is that they
appear to be robust and stable, suggesting therefore that capital flight
has been a constant feature since the neoliberal reforms were introduced
in the Philippines.
Furthermore, since the two results refer to the fuel linkages as well,
we can combine them with the results on the CDET earlier. Thus we
can conclude that for each dollar of external debt, USD 1.07 ended up
as capital flight during the deregulation period. The amount is about
USD 1.19 during the financial liberalization period. If we exclude
both neoliberal policies, the Philippines would still experience USD
0.33 to USD 0.47 of capital flight for each dollar of external debt (as
discussed above), but would only be due to external borrowing. We
can therefore conclude that, in the case of the Philippines, neoliberal
policies increased capital flight.
Now, on both the CDET equations, we found that the results for
the interactions between deregulation and financial liberalization with
capital flight (i.e., D1*KF and D2*KF, respectively) likewise reveal
further borrowing from USD 0.82 to USD 1.03 for each dollar of
capital flight, with deregulation and financial liberalization, respectively.
These results are fuel-type processes, too, and so we can also combine
them with the earlier results. Thus, during the neoliberal regime, the
impact of capital flight on external borrowing increased from USD
1.50 to USD 1.71. Also, if we exclude the neoliberal policies, the
Philippines would still acquire USD 0.68 to USD 0.70 of external
debt due to capital flight alone. We can therefore conclude that, in the
case of the Philippines, neoliberal policies increased external borrowing.
We further examine the results in table 2. In particular, we
calculated the elasticities of both capital flight and external borrowing
to determine how their respective intensities changed as neoliberal
policies were pursued over time. The results are shown in table 3.
From the table, we found that a 1 percent increase in external
borrowing during the deregulation period resulted (in a total of) 0.67
percent increase in capital flight (CDET plus D1*CDET in table 3),
whereas during the financial liberalization period, about 0.64 percent
(CDET plus D2*CDET in table 3). That is, regardless of the type of
policy, these results suggest that the overall responsiveness of capital
flight remained relatively the same (although we note that specific
results for D1*CDET and D2*CDET indicate that financial liberalization
had a lower elasticity than deregulation). We argue that this result
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indicates that despite the neoliberal policies, some of the external
debts might have been used to expand economic activities in the
country. We further argue that because the overall elasticity for the fuel
linkages remained the same over time, it means that external borrowings
were ultimately taken out as capital flight. We can thus infer from table
3 that capital flight would be a constant feature under a neoliberal
regime, at least in the case of the Philippines.
Other interesting results were also obtained on the elasticities of
external borrowing (table 4). We found that a 1 percent increase in
capital flight during the deregulation period resulted in 1 percent
increase in external debt (KF plus D1*KF in table 4), while for the
financial liberalization period, the figure was lower, at 0.85 percent (KF
plus D
1
*KF in table 4). What these results suggest is that neoliberal
policies can have some benefits to the country, in particular, by
lowering the overall tendency to acquire external debts or willingness
of lenders to extend credit when their macroeconomic expectations are
not met, among others. But we argue that this result can be due to the
fact that the Philippines was largely cut off from the international debt
markets until around the mid-1990s.
Perhaps, too, neoliberal policies have shifted the dynamics for
external borrowing. For instance, financial liberalization (and similar
developments elsewhere) facilitated capital flow surges. When Philippine
authorities received these flows, the authorities accommodated them
by sterilizing the excess supply of foreign exchange, resulting in an
accumulation of international reserves. With large reserves, it meant a
decrease in the probability of debt default, and so there was more
external borrowing. As shown in table 4, the elasticity of lagged total
Table 3. Comparative elasticities of capital flight given neoliberal economic policies 
Dependent: KF Run 1: Deregulation Run 2: Financial liberalization 
Variable Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
CDET 0.33 0.35 0.47 0.49 
DEBT 0.14 1.32 0.13 1.22 
RES-1 -0.61 -0.96 -0.78 -1.23 
GROW-1 -0.63 -0.36 -0.50 -0.28 
D1*CDET 0.74 0.32   
D2*CDET   0.72 0.15 
Note: KF = capital flight; CDET = net additions to external debt; DEBT = stock of 
external debt; RES = total international reserves; GROW = country GDP growth 
rate; CAD = country current account deficit; D1 = dummy variable for period of 
deregulation: value of 1 in 1986 onward and 0 otherwise; D2 = dummy variable for 
period of financial liberalization (which includes deregulation): value of 1 in 1993 
onward and 0 otherwise. Elasticity measures the degree of responsiveness of KF 
due to a 1 percent change in X (variables). 
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reserves (RES
-1
) is consistent with this view. At the same time, there was
a decline in the external sector’s foreign-exchange-generation capacity,
which is a direct result of financial liberalization (see Lim 2004). As
such, external borrowing (albeit short-term external debt) was acquired
to finance the country’s external imbalance. The elasticity of the lagged
of current account deficits (i.e., CAD-1) shown in table 4 is consistent
with this argument. In fact, the overall elasticity of lagged total
international reserves (RES
-1
) plus that of lagged of current account
deficit (CAD-1) was twelve times higher in the financial liberalization
period than in the deregulation period.
Finally, we discuss the results for the other indirect linkages shown
in table 2. We found that higher levels of economic performance are
negatively correlated with capital flight (KF equations); that is, robust
growth would lower capital flight. The converse is also true and, in fact,
more pertinent, given the Philippines’ economic history. The results
on international reserves (KF equations) indicate a negative correlation
with capital flight; that is, more international reserves would lower
capital flight as it suggests a lower probability of a balance of payments
crisis. Last, large current account deficits (CDET equations) mean
more external borrowing (CDET equations). The results indicate (as in
table 4) that with financial liberalization, more external borrowing was
undertaken to finance the current account deficits.
IMPLICATION: A HOLLOWING-OUT PROCESS
The documented large amounts of capital flight from the Philippines
reveal large amounts of resources beyond social control. The figures are
lost resources that are not being utilized to benefit the country. Since
Table 4: Comparative elasticities of external borrowing given neoliberal economic policies 
Dependent: CDET Run 1: Deregulation Run 2: Financial liberalization 
Variable Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
KF 0.71 0.66 0.68 0.64
RES-1 0.05 0.07 0.59 0.87
CAD-1 0.05 0.01 0.33 0.09
D1*KF 0.82 0.34  
D2*KF   1.03 0.21
Notes: KF = capital flight; CDET = net additions to external debt; DEBT = stock of external
debt; RES = total international reserves; GROW = country GDP growth rate; CAD = country
current account deficit; D1 = dummy variable for period of deregulation: value of 1 in 1986
onwards and 0 otherwise; D2 = dummy variable for period of financial liberalization (which
includes deregulation): value of 1 in 1993 onwards and 0 otherwise. Elasticity measures the
degree of responsiveness of CDET due to a 1 percent change in Y (variables). 
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capital flight is typically undertaken by elites, we infer from the results
that the majority of Filipinos bear a disproportionate burden of the
adverse impacts of capital flight and external indebtedness. The
documented revolving-door process of capital flight and external
borrowing means that resources (both domestic and foreign) ultimately
fled the country. Further analysis on the revolving door revealed that
capital flight actually increased, especially in the 1990s during the
financial liberalization period. Arguably, as the neoliberal regime
deepened, expanded, and thus became entrenched in the country,
there was also intensified capital flight and external borrowing. Given
the empirical evidence, we thus argue that the neoliberal regime
(including the socioeconomic and political dynamics that come with
it) underpinned capital flight and external borrowing, ultimately
hollowing out the Philippine economy. Juxtaposing the results and
the Philippines’ economic performance over the years, it can also be
argued that capital flight played an important factor in derailing the
country’s takeoff to higher stages of development. Perhaps because of
capital flight the country lost the opportunity to become an Asian
economic tiger.
CONCLUSION
Using a measure of capital flight, we documented large amounts of lost
resources from the Philippines. Capital flight was USD 16 billion in
the 1970s, USD 36 billion in the 1980s, and USD 43 billion in the
1990s. Between 1970 and 2002, total capital flight was estimated at
USD 131 billion (in 1995 constant prices). Such resources would have
been available to generate more output and create additional jobs,
which could have brought about a better quality of growth and, in the
process, raised the social welfare of many Filipinos.
Also, using a model of analyzing capital flight, we found that the
upsurge of capital flight coincided with the application (and the
consequent entrenchment) of the neoliberal regime in the Philippines.
We thus question the conventional wisdom that neoliberal policies
discourage capital flight and ensure efficient use of external borrowing.
That is to say, the untrammeled access to external capital would
encourage domestic entrepreneurs to generate economic activities or
facilitate the creation of businesses, jobs, and productive infrastructures
in the country. In fact, we found that deregulation and financial
liberalization only facilitated the inflows of external capital, and it was
69EDSEL L. BEJA JR.
increasingly used to fuel capital flight. Of course, economic and
political crises, as well as the external shocks, play important roles in
inducing capital flight. But under the neoliberal regime, such crises
only meant greater levels of capital flight because there are more avenues
for undertaking flight.
The fact that capital flight means large lost opportunities to the
Philippines means that there are also large unaccounted adverse effects
on Philippines society. When there are large externalities, government
intervention is necessary and in fact justified. Therefore the government
must and should explore progressive ways or mechanisms to manage
capital flows and restrict capital flight. We further argue that this goal
is best achieved through the application of capital-management
techniques (see also Crotty and Epstein 1996, 1999; Epstein, Grabel,
and Jomo 2003). Using such and related policy tools would enable the
Philippines to retain and attract capital to sustain growth and
development (see also Nembhard 1996; Montiel and Reinhart 1999;
Chang and Grabel 2004). Such policy tools would enable the Philippines
to regain control over policymaking and allow the government to
pursue more sensible policies. For example, as a way to manage capital
flows, capital controls can be utilized to affect both the volume and
composition of capital formation, especially in directing funds to the
tradable or productive sectors to push the country toward sustainable
industrialization. With macroeconomic regulation, the Philippines
would be able to facilitate financial intermediation, including financial
deepening; and generate additional tax revenues and funds for public
infrastructure and services, among others. During times of crises,
capital controls can also be utilized, particularly to stem massive capital
outflows, to keep panic and speculation at bay, and more important,
rehabilitate the financial system and allow the government to work on
economic recovery. Obviously, the goal of capital-management
techniques is not to return or reimpose financial repression, but rather
the goal is for the government to regain control, and to have sufficient
space, over macroeconomic policies and the direction of development.
It is thus critical to rethink government intervention. Indeed a
more substantive role of the government is needed. Accepting and, in
turn, pursuing a minimum government policy is only counterproductive
to the economic and development goals. At the minimum, we argue
that the Philippine government must ensure and prioritize domestic
responsibility, especially in setting economic targets and articulating a
realistic vision of development. It must pursue policies that reflect and
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are sensitive to the domestic characteristics and strengths. We argue
further that the government must embed itself in society so that it can
constructively engage with and respond to various domestic demands
and withstand external challenges. On one level, it must permit and
encourage constructive relationships (e.g., cooperative arrangements
with the private sector, a meaningful involvement of civil society, etc.),
but then, on another level, it must also regulate economic and social
processes that are counterproductive to realizing a robust economy and
domestic development (e.g., putting restraints on speculative capital,
checking unsound environmental practices, etc.), as well as address
attempts to undermine its capacity (i.e., controlling elites’ dominance
in policy making, neoliberal thinking, etc.).
Finally, it should be stressed that when external debts are squandered
by elites or are inappropriately used to benefit only a few, it is the rest
of society that suffers. More important, the nontrivial economic costs
of external indebtedness and capital flight are imposed on the majority.
Thus from an economic justice point of view, these provide basis to
question the legitimacy of external debt, itself the rationale for
continuing to honor such debts.
Our findings provide compelling support to demand for a better
management of external debts by debtors and creditors alike. The
Philippine government is responsible for making sure that external
debts benefit all Filipinos—not used to enrich a few. Thus a government
that misuses funds is itself liable for the external debt and must not
impose this burden on the public. Creditors must also share responsibility
in the prudent management of the Philippines’ external debts. Such a
role can be achieved either through an application of sound lending
policies or some involvement in the effective use or disbursement of
funds. In cases where external borrowings were actually misused, or
proof cannot be presented to demonstrate that the funds were actually
used to improve the social conditions of Filipinos, or the borrowed
funds could not be traced, we can conclude that they were diverted to
line private pockets, and more likely as capital flight. If creditors ignore
or pretend not to see that the borrowed funds were used to benefit only
a few, or they do not act to redress the situation, they too are
accountable for the Philippines’ indebtedness. In these cases, Filipinos
must question the legitimacy of the external debt itself and the
rationale for continuing to honor external debts that Philippine
society, on the whole, did not benefit from. Accordingly, alternative
debt-relief programs should be explored by both the government and
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creditors, like interest-rate payment cancellations (but still paying the
principal, except when the borrowed funds are odious in nature) and
rescheduling of debt principal. Debt relief should be demanded from
the creditors so that the Philippines will not continue to bear the
consequences of external indebtedness.D
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NOTES
1.  “Neoliberalism” refers to the contemporary application of the (classical) free-market
doctrines. It is characterized by the emphasis on markets over economic affairs, an
enhancement of private sector’s role and scope, thus a reduction of the public
sector involvement in various affairs, and the promotion of an understanding of
what constitutes “sound” economic policies (that includes, among others, balanced
budget, inflation targeting, and labor market flexibility). This approach is commonly
referred to as “Washington Consensus.” Thus, a “neoliberal regime” promotes
neoliberalism in economic and social affairs, with the underlying idea that it leads
to an economic environment that is efficient, transparent, and less prone to
crises. Although, in recent years, there have been modifications to the “Washington
Consensus,” it can still be argued that the core elements have remained the same.
2.  “Capital flight” is the movement of capital from a resource-scarce developing
country to avoid social controls. Basically, we are measuring the net unrecorded
capital outflows. “Social controls” refer to the actual or potential, as well as the
formal and informal, controls on capital, which include societal norms and
expectations on the use of foreign exchange, the legal, extralegal, or
nongovernmental exactions on the use or allocation of resources, including
taxation, the government’s capacity to direct resources into productive endeavors,
among others, thus engendering growth, and, consequently, realizing development.
The degree and scope of social control can be extended or reduced if the economic
and political circumstances warrant a change. See related discussions in Bowles
and Gintis (1988).
3.  “Deregulation” refers to decontrols on the interest rates, credit allocation,
exchange rate, among others, and “financial liberalization” refers to decontrols on
capital movements. In other words, the former is principally internally oriented
reforms, while the latter is principally externally oriented reforms. On the debates,
see McKinnon (1991), Caprio Atiyas, and Hanson (1994, 2001), Eatwell (1997),
and Williamson and Mahar (1998); on the role of financial liberalization in the
Asian crisis, see Jomo (1998) and Chang, Palma, and Whittaker (2001); and in the
context of capital flight, see Gibson and Tsakalotos (1993), Lensink, Hermes, and
Murinde (1998), and Demir (2004). In the Philippines, deregulation started in the
early 1980s, but only in the mid-1990s was a wide-scale and aggressive financial
72 CAPITAL FLIGHT AND THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY
liberalization implemented, among others, opening of the capital account in 1993
(thus liberalizing capital flows), and deregulating the domestic banking sector.
Deregulation of interest rate and foreign-exchange rate was introduced much
earlier in the 1980s.
4.   Earlier studies on capital flight from the Philippines are Boyce and Zarsky (1988),
Boyce (1992, 1993), Vos (1992), Lamberte et al. (1992), and Vos and Yap (1996).
5.   See Beja (2005) for a longer discussion of procedures to estimate capital flight. In
this paper, we use a modified residual method because our objective is to account
for all types of capital and foreign exchange flows. What we obtain as a result is an
estimate of capital flight that is merely indicative of the actual size of capital flight
yet prima facie evidence of capital flight. There are other transactions like illegal
capital flight that we cannot measure because they remain unrecorded. But we
note that capital flight can take place within normal processes, which therefore
makes the estimation of capital flight more challenging.
6.   Obviously, the number of adjustments that can be made depends on the available
data, including alternative sources of data. Here, we could not make an adjustment
for the impact of foreign-exchange fluctuations on short-term capital flows because
information on their composition is not available.
7.  An extension of my work deals with the class dimension of capital, trade, and
human flows. I hope to pursue this as a long-term research agenda.
8.   In order to transform the Philippine economy from its dismal status as the “sick
man” of Asia, the Ramos administration embarked on an economic program to
make the country take off to NIC-hood at the turn of the twenty-first century.
Thus the slogan: “Philippines 2000!” From 1992 to 1993, wide-scale and aggressive
deregulation and financial liberation programs were undertaken but without
instituting or (even) neglecting the requisite governance reforms and administrative
capacity. We follow the Ramos administration slogan and say: “Capital Flight
2000!”
9.   Deregulation was introduced much earlier in the 1980s, but we argue that only
after the mid-1980s that economic reforms were systematically pursued. Financial
liberalization was pursued in the late 1980s, but like deregulation, systematic
implementation happened only in the early 1990s. In fact, only in the Ramos
administration was financial liberalization made comprehensive and completed.
In the regressions, we argue that if deregulation and financial liberalization are
effective (say, as disciplining mechanisms on the use of funds that neoliberal
policies are supposed to achieve, among others), such policies will result in proper
utilization of external borrowing. In the regression, we expect that the interaction
terms of D
1
 and D
2
 with CDET will indicate lower coefficients for the latter.
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